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This article critically addresses the varied ways in which political parties can be
said to represent. Three important ideal-typical modes of party representation are
outlined: the popular, the statal, and the reﬂexive. Arguments are offered for
countering the common view that, for example, popular modes are the most
democratic, and statal modes the least democratic. Statal modes in particular are
often taken to be an indicator of a decline in parties’ representative functions;
however, shifting modes of party representation often have more to do with stra-
tegic choices and contextual pressures than democratic ideals. No one ideal-typical
mode is intrinsically more democratic than others. Further, there is evidence that a
new mode of party representation, the reﬂexive, may be emerging; parties may be
transforming into something they never were in order to continue to do the things
they have always sought to do. Whether democracy is unthinkable save for political
parties is no longer the question we need to ask. Rather, we need to ask: what kinds
of representative democracy are thinkable? And what forms of party claims, if any,
are appropriate to them?
Introduction
Many recent analyses of political parties cite the assertion that democracy is
unthinkable save for political parties, in order to ask whether it is still true, or (less
often) if it was ever true. The motivation behind a good deal of that work is
concern about the apparently declining ability of parties to provide representation,
one of their core functions.
How one approaches this issue depends very much on how ‘representation’ is
understood. The key argument I wish to make is this: to get a clearer view of
where parties have come from, and where they may be going, it is helpful to
rethink core aspects of our approach to representation as a concept and a practice.
Just how we might best do that I discuss below under the heading of the
‘representative claim’. Looking at representation through these altered lenses
highlights the fact that the past, present and potential future of representation by
parties is not simply a story of rise and decline and an uncertain future, but rather
one about different modes of representation. To put the point bluntly: political
parties do not so much represent, or fail to represent; rather, on a more ﬁne-
grained view of representation, they claim to represent. And the claims involved
can take – and historically have taken – a variety of forms. No one mode
of representative claim-making is intrinsically more democratic than another –
although one or other may resonate more with dominant conceptions of
democracy in speciﬁc contexts (I will return to this point brieﬂy later). How
parties attempt to negotiate these forms in different circumstances, how they vary
the content and presentation of their representative claims in and across different
contexts, helps us to clarify the challenges parties face today and into the future.
It can also provide us with fruitful ways to consider what sorts of party repre-
sentative claims are likely to be more resonant, or ultimately successful, in
certain contexts, along with how parties can tailor their own images and their
portrayals of constituents to their advantage.
Altering the way that we conceptualise and analyse political representation
further helps us usefully reframe a range of issues and debates connected to
political parties – not all of which are discussed in the prevailing literature,
despite their importance. Too often, ideal or proper ‘representation’ is understood
(openly or implicitly) as something done by parties that: (a) are deeply rooted in
signiﬁcant social groups (class or ethnicity, for example); (b) gain strong partisan
support from ‘their’ group; and (c) act as vehicles for that group through a
persistent ideology and set of policy proposals. But to take that approach is to
generalise and moralise on the basis of one historical, and clearly signiﬁcant,
model of representation, which (generally speaking) characterised western party
systems in the immediate post-Second Word War period. If that is taken to be
how representation should be done – if that is the ‘golden age’ – then it is little
surprise that the present and well-documented problems attending political
parties – membership decline, voting decline, decline in partisan support, etc –
are taken as core evidence of a crisis of representation, or indeed a crisis of
representative democracy. The representative claim framework, as I hope to
demonstrate, helps us to resist such generalising and moralising, and to show us
that the dynamics of representation, and of representative democracy, can rea-
sonably be interpreted in alternative ways, leading to different conclusions about
the problems and prospects of political parties.1 In exploring these and other
issues, ultimately I conclude that the ‘thinkability’ of different visions of
representative democracy – and what roles they might offer for (one or other
vision of) parties – is what is really at issue.
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What is the shift in interpretation of the idea of representation behind this
analysis? I argue that we should not view representation simply as a fact that
results from an election – by far the dominant view, in political science and in
politics, over a long period up to now – but rather as a process of making claims
in electoral but also many other contexts. None of us is ever fully represented –
representation of our interests or identities in politics is always partial. It follows
that representative claims – electoral as well as non-electoral ones – are
redeemed, if at all, only imperfectly. The simple fact that we elect a candidate to
ofﬁce (which is signiﬁcant) does not mean they can or will speak for the range of
our potential interests and identities.
The ‘representative claim’ consists of ﬁve key elements – maker, subject,
object, referent, and audience. Someone makes the claim (a maker), and they
make the claim about someone or something (a subject) standing for something
(an object) to a group (an audience). For example, if a politician makes himself
the subject who stands for an object, the object is his idea of his constituency –
‘Above all, these people are angry about crime on our streets, and they want
tough action now’, for example – rather than the referent, which is all the other
things the constituency is, or might be. Audiences might accept representative
claims, or they might reject or ignore them. In other words, representation is an
ongoing process of making and receiving claims – in, between, and outside
electoral cycles. Angela Merkel may claim to represent her constituency, and
her country, but equally Bono or Bob Geldof can claim to represent African
communities that are caught in poverty due to the nature of international debt;
the exiled Dalai Lama can claim to represent the Tibetan people, and Amnesty
International can claim to speak for unjustly imprisoned people in various
countries. Not all claims are democratically acceptable, of course. We need
evidence that claims are not rejected by the would-be constituencies that they
invoke.2 One beneﬁt of this framework is that it invites us to look closely at the
impact of a broad range of representative claims, asking how, why and whom
they represent (if anyone), without our very deﬁnitions determining whether or to
what extent they constitute cases of representation.
I have offered a fuller account and defence of adopting the representative claim
framework elsewhere.3 The key point is that political representation is a variable,
dynamic and competitive process encompassing in principle a range of actors,
and not a static and incontestable factual status that some (the elected) possess
utterly and others (everyone else) lack utterly. It is also a phenomenon with strong
aesthetic and cultural components – would-be representatives present themselves
as such and such, to a constituency and perhaps a wider audience which itself is
characterised (or portrayed) by the claimant in particular, selective ways.
As this brief summary shows, representative claims can (and have) been made,
by and about political parties, political leaders, and a variety of other groups and
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movements, in a great variety of ways. Our particular focus here is on the use
of the representative claim framework to examine political parties and their
contribution to that familiar hybrid, representative democracy. Looking at poli-
tical parties through the lens of the representative claim brings to light the fact
that parties need to be creative actors, offering portrayals and enticements to
constituents and audiences. Those portrayals and enticements are always subject
to dispute, by opposing parties and an array of other political actors. Careful
strategic choices (and gambles) need to be made by parties – how do we claim to
stand for the interests of this group? Which aspect of their interests do we focus on
(and which do we downplay or sideline?). How do we convince them that their
primary interests really are what we say they are? What resources can we call on to
back up our claims? Crucially, answers to these questions depend a great deal on
when and where the claims are made; different resources (technological, political,
economic etc) are available, and different strategies thinkable, in different eras
and places.
Party representative claims have taken many forms in many countries. The
bulk of this article is taken up with a stylized analysis of just three important
ideal-typical modes of representative claim-making: the popular, the statal, and
the reﬂexive. I use these three ideal-types as a reasonable short-cut to enable clear
hypotheses to be formed. They are intended to capture and order a good deal of
historical and institutional complexity, as well as being non-evaluative.
The popular mode of claiming representation is characterised by dominant
parties claiming to speak as delegates of certain politicised social interests in an
electoral context on the basis of a relatively ﬁxed ideology. This modern mode
was characteristic of pre-war and immediate post-war western democracy and
featured nation-based mass parties.
The statal mode of claiming representation is characterised by parties claiming
to speak as trustees of depoliticised issue-based positions in electoral and other
competitive contexts on the basis of ﬂexible ideologies and policy views. This
late-modern mode is characteristic of the period since around the 1980s to the
present day, and features ‘catch-all’ and ‘cartel’ party forms.
The reﬂexive mode is characterised by party participation in variegated pro-
cesses of claiming to speak as sympathisers of local and issue-based positions in
electoral and a variety of other mediated contexts on the basis of pragmatic and
ﬂexible policy programmes, and in co-operation or alliance with other types of
movements and groups. There is some evidence that this post-modern mode may
become characteristic of the near future, and may feature various embedded and
decentred party forms.
A number of initial points of explanation are in order. First, these ideal-types
of representative claims overlap with each other in empirical terms. They are
conceptually exclusive, although empirically, to some degree, overlapping.
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However, seeking conceptual clarity is a key motivation behind the use of ideal-
types. Second, locating these ideal-types within certain broad historical periods
does not conﬁne claim-making of that sort to those periods. Popular, statal and
reﬂexive claims can, in principle, be made at one time by different parties in one
country, or indeed by one party at one time in one country. Varied strategies are,
in principle, available to parties for the making of claims to be representative
of certain groups or interests, and parties can shift among different modes of
representative claim. Which mode of claim-making is most appropriate to, or most
likely to succeed in, a given context is another matter. And third, to reiterate, none
of the three ideal-typical modes of claiming representation is implicitly or intrin-
sically more democratic than any other. That is not to say that, in a given context,
one might not be experienced as more democratic than others, or widely felt to be
more in tune with dominant ideas of what it means to be democratic.
I move on now to ﬂesh out the popular, statal and reﬂexive ideal-types of
representative claim-making, and to illustrate the key claims I have made about
the usefulness of this approach. I shall then examine the competition as repre-
sentative claimants that parties face today (and are likely to face even more in the
future), before making some concluding remarks.
Ideal-type 1 – Popular claims
I stated above that the popular mode of claiming representation is characterised
by dominant parties claiming to speak as agents of certain politicised social
interests in an electoral context on the basis of a relatively ﬁxed ideology. A
modern mode characteristic of pre-war and immediate post-war western
democracy, it featured nation-based mass parties.
This mode of claim is popular in the sense that parties position themselves as
rooted ﬁrmly in pre-existing social cleavages. A key example is the social class
cleavages that gave rise, for example, to labour or social democratic parties
claiming to speak for the working classes. Parties present themselves, or are
presented as, responding to circumstances that are largely outside their control –
the deeper class, ethnic or regional structures of their societies. Parties position
themselves as vehicles for these societal interests, a positioning that is thinkable
because those interests are understood as real and relatively enduring. Parties are
‘agents’ of those interests,4 are ‘social actors’.5
Parties’ positioning as social actors was bolstered by mass memberships,
high degrees of partisan support, and a rootedness in social and cultural life.
For example, European Christian democratic, labour and social democratic
parties invariably had strong links with powerful trade unions at local and
national levels, and played a strong cultural role even in individuals’ social and
family lives.
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The perception that these underlying interests were relatively enduring and
trumped other interests in importance meant that relatively enduring or consistent
party ideologies could be forged and maintained – along with ideologies, policy
programmes and platforms. Also important to the popular mode of representative
claim-making is the central place of elections in ‘representative democracy’.
Historically, of course, elections have faced competitors as the primary way
through which democratic action and democratic choice can be exercised – not
least lot selection, which was prominent in classic and even early modern notions
of democracy, before fading.6 And further, the place and the basis of elections is
national – rooted in the nation-state as a formally sovereign political, legal and
cultural entity.
The dominance of electoral democracy over other potential understandings of
democracy and the assumption that parties are, so to speak, bottom-up agents of
pre-set social interests, contributes to a sense of parties as rightful representa-
tives, even the only type of entity that legitimately could claim to be politically
representative. For this reason, parties can make representative claims in the
popular mode more or less implicitly. The stronger the social, cultural and his-
torical circumstances supporting a view of parties in elections as the vehicles for
political representation, the less pressure there need be on party candidates or
spokespersons to make their representative claims explicit or open. In a sense, the
system and its supporting assumptions do a good deal of the work for parties and
their candidates, positioning them in place by default as the primary if not the
sole legitimate type of representatives.
So, representative claims by parties made in the popular mode are claims to
speak for or to stand for largely pre-existing (class, ethnic, regional) social
interests. Presented as arising out of societal interests, parties are seen as vehicles
of, products of, and hence almost organically reﬂective of those pre-set interests.
A broader cultural emphasis on class, and politically the primacy of the left–right
cleavage that springs from major class interests, facilitates this conception of
parties’ representative status. Popular representative claim-making, then, reﬂects
perceptions of parties as lacking serious competitors.
Historically, the popular mode of claiming representation was most evident in
the period of the rise of mass political parties in the developing democracies of
Europe and elsewhere, from the early 20th century to around the immediate post-
Second World War period. This ideal-type does not depend on this periodisation,
but the link (the derivation) is clear enough. This is widely seen as the period of
the rise of the mass political party, and of the period when parties were strongest,
most widely supported, and most popular.
The key point here is that representative claims are chosen, and take their
particular forms, depending on varied circumstances. Popular mode representa-
tive claims are claims that suit a context in which mass parties with strong
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partisan support can key into (show their origins in and their reﬂection of) widely
accepted views of relatively ﬁxed societal interests. It is important to note that
this mode (or indeed any other mode) of claim-making can persist even when the
circumstances that make it potentially efﬁcacious have altered fundamentally.
Parties for example may continue to offer popular-mode claims where the social
group they claim to represent is more diffuse and less sure of the nature, strength
and distinctiveness of its identity, or where organisational features of parties do
not support their popular claims – and they may be less successful electorally,
and in other ways, as a consequence.
Ideal-type 2 – Statal claims
I noted earlier that the statal7 mode of claiming representation is characterised by
parties claiming to speak as trustees of issue-based positions in electoral and
other competitive contexts on the basis of ﬂexible ideologies and policy views.
This late-modern mode is characteristic of the period since around the 1980s to
the present day, and features ‘catch-all’ and ‘cartel’ party forms.
Statal representative claims are made on a quite different basis to those
characteristic of the popular ideal-type. Popular claims seek to reﬂect and to
reinforce a perception that parties represent because they are rooted in and
derived from enduring societal groupings. In that respect, they have a ‘bottom-
up’ character, the ultimate form of which is that the government represents the
people. Statal claims may be offered as, or presented as, bottom-up claims, but
that appearance will often not mesh with a reality of their being more top-down –
both (a) emphasising (through practice rather than rhetoric) the performance of
state functions, such as the stafﬁng and operating of government, and (b) in a
broader sense representing the state to the people via crafted depictions of
national interests and aspirations.
Regarding the statal mode of representative claim-making as an issue of
representation marks a departure from much analysis of political parties and
representation – and it matters that it does. In their wide-ranging review of trends
over several decades, Bartolini and Mair for example write that: ‘What we witness
is a shift in the balance of party functions from the combined representative and
procedural roles that were characteristic of the mass party in the so-called golden
age to a more exclusively procedural function’.8 The core concern here is that
parties may be ‘losing their capacity as agents of representation’,9 even while
procedural (or institutional or governmental) roles are maintained or enhanced.
A central point to note here is that government–people representation is nested
within another, more abstract mode, namely state–nation representation. A political
party or parties who form a government may claim to represent the people; that is
one option. They may also – and potentially at the same time – ‘move up a level’
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and claim to speak as the state, for the nation. State and nation are more abstract
entities, but their symbolic and cultural power as the basis of representative claims
may be no less for all that. It may be the case, for example, that parties are no
longer rooted deeply in, or deriving strong and consistent partisan support from,
relatively settled societal groups. But that does not mean that they are no longer
representing. The representative claims that they tend to make, or which are best
enabled, are simply different from those that are characteristic of a different mode
of claiming. In their claims – their presentation of themselves and the portrayals of
constituents and nation that they offer – they may simply have ‘moved up a level’.
I shall now expand brieﬂy on further key features of statal claims. Parties, in
this mode, are ‘state actors’,10 more a vehicle for presenting the state to society
than vice versa. Their ideologies are more ﬂexible, and more changeable, than is
the case under the popular mode. There is more scope for making claims to
represent people and groups not previously part of that party’s constituency or
focus, for example for conservative parties of the right to construct a portrayal of
working class voter aspirations in order to try to appeal to that group of voters. In
the light of these features, statal representative claim-making can be a highly
strategic and calculated matter, involving, for example, party strategists asking
themselves: ‘what image of these people, who don’t normally vote for us, can we
offer to them? Can we offer a future picture of themselves, under our govern-
ment, which may compel them towards supporting us?’
The statal mode also involves much more staging of explicit claims to
represent. The making of representative claims involves performance, and many
issues of ‘presentation of self’ and depiction of others are wrapped up in claim-
making.11 There are no more ‘captive’ constituencies of, for example, large
numbers of party members or reliable class or ethnicity-based partisan voters.
Audiences need to be wooed, rather than assumed; messages need to be pack-
aged and targeted with care. And representative claims need to be quite explicit;
background culture and habit and circumstance will not make the claims for a
party, they need to put out their stall and make it clear that they seek support from
a range of potential constituencies. Parties cannot rely on a generalised
assumption that they are representative, that they perform that function by virtue
of their very existence. Rather, they must generate, promote and encourage the
view that they can, and they will, represent.
Further, where the popular mode of claim-making involved an implicit notion
that parties operated hermetically within one nation, the statal mode involves the
need for parties to assert their national credentials. They might ﬁnd it advanta-
geous strategically to claim to represent selected interests outside the boundaries
of the nation-state as well, for example the wider region (‘Europe’), indigenous
peoples, or the interests of women internationally. And their claim-making will
occur in a competitive context. Many groups that are not parties will be active
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politically, claiming to speak for a wide array of interests and people, both within
the nation and more widely. A number of such groups may have memberships
that outstrip those of major parties, such as key environmental and animal
welfare groups.
The statal ideal-type is a mode of representative claim-making that is not
conﬁned to one era. Like the others, it can and has been attempted in varied
contexts. How successful it may have been as a strategy will depend on many
factors, not least its appropriateness to its time and place. Nevertheless, this mode
corresponds to a range of assessments of parties in western countries in the
period from around the late 1970s or early 1980s to the present day. This is the
era of the ‘catch-all’ party – which seeks support outside its traditional base – and
later the ‘cartel’ party, which is largely state rather than supporter funded,
and identiﬁes more with the state, and indeed in some cases other major parties,
than with supporter groups.12
Statal claims are facilitated by varied broad trends evident in this historical
period. The rapid development of media technologies, ﬁrst television and now
the web, facilitates varied, targeted and staged claim-making to diverse audi-
ences. A decline in the clarity of boundaries between social classes – and con-
comitant trends towards individualisation – fosters a need for parties to reach out
to potential new, and for them unusual, supporters. Voters are more educated than
ever before, which can make them harder to convince and, as a consequence,
potentially more cynical about the political process generally and parties in
particular; so they need to be tempted to support a party in ever-more varied,
imaginative and persistent ways.
However, it is not simply a case of parties making statal claims having to work
harder just to stay in the same place. Statal claims arose in a context of oppor-
tunity for parties, as well as challenges. They may need to stage more carefully
what they could once take more for granted, but the staging techniques available
have sometimes brought new generations of supporters to their fold. It may be, in
the words of Schmitter, that these shifts lead to the conclusion that ‘parties are
not what they once were’,13 but that does not necessarily mean that they are less
than they once were. Their representative claims are different.
Ideal-type 3 – Reﬂexive claims
The reﬂexive mode of claiming representation is characterised by party partici-
pation in variegated processes of claiming to speak as sympathisers of local and
issue-based positions in electoral and a variety of other mediated contexts on the
basis of pragmatic and ﬂexible policy programmes. There is some evidence that
elements and signs of this post-modern mode, featuring embedded and decentred
party forms, may be emergent in a number of countries today.
Modes and Strategies of Political Parties 279
According to this ideal-type, representative claims are made by parties pre-
senting themselves as embedded in, and speaking for, a plurality of societal
interests. Those interests are neither perceived as, nor presented by parties as,
permanent. Parties present themselves as a type of listening organisation that
forges alliances around speciﬁc value-driven goals with local movements and
groups and special-interest groups, and base their representative claims on the
sense of authentic connectedness that this evokes. The intention behind the
claims is to represent varied and shifting groups to the state and in the state.
Policy in the reﬂexive mode is deliberated over with statistically representative
groups and the local and national issue-based groups that parties seek to forge
alliances with. Indeed, parties present themselves as operating at the centre of a
‘deliberative democracy’.14 General values may be put forward, but these do not
add up to an ‘ideology’; more often they are procedural values, and above all the
values of deliberation and consultation, rather than values that predeﬁne the
contours of policy. Ideologies, if they are worthy of the name, are ﬂexible and
responsive to new ideas, interests and arguments. Parties operating in this mode
are strongly aware of their need to demonstrate their attachment, their rootedness,
in communities and their concerns, but again they do not conﬁne themselves to
one community or one set of interests. They present themselves as open to
inﬂuence by existing and new interests, and seek to back this up through
decentralised internal organisation, allowing a good deal of autonomy to local
ﬁgures to inﬂuence their agendas.
Parties in this mode may use the rhetoric of the ‘open party’ – they are open to
people, ideas and new inﬂuences, and procedurally open to debate and to
changing their minds. Representative claims are made explicitly (because no
potential constituency or audience can be taken for granted), but less is claimed –
claims are based on speciﬁc issues and procedural styles. There is no captive
audience, only a shifting one, variously expanding and contracting. Policy
proposals are made shorter-term.
Reﬂexive representative claims also involve parties taking a reﬂexive attitude
towards national and other jurisdictional boundaries. Claiming to represent the
interests of people within a country may entail claiming to represent many
outside it too – or indeed non-citizen residents and temporary residents. The basis
of some claims is cross-national or multi-jurisdictional. Parties still, of course,
compete in national and local elections. But they do so – they make claims – in
ways that explicitly recognise the legitimacy of claims and claimants of non-
candidates of many kinds, and offer to foster elements of direct, participative or
deliberative democracy to include stakeholders and ordinary citizens in gov-
ernmental decision-making. Parties operating by reﬂexive claims seek to embed
themselves in plural communities, seeking authorisations and a sense of authentic
connection. They may well forge electoral alliances whereby, for example,
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environmental or human rights or small business bodies effectively run cam-
paigns alongside, or in alliance with, the party.
Weberian ideal-types, of course, are not designed to be accurate representa-
tions of particular realities. Rather, they are abstractions designed to represent
general, and in some cases emergent, sets of institutional properties and patterns.
The ideal-types of party representation set out here are no exception. None-
theless, to be (useful) ideal-types, they must offer some discernible purchase on
realities; a distinctive, illuminating empirical force. This issue arises especially
with regard to the reﬂexive mode of party representation. I have implied that
there is evidence that this mode is emergent. Evidence for this claim can, I would
argue, be gleaned from a number of developments.
1. Explicit attention is being paid by a number of major parties in western
democracies to voter disengagement, and in many cases to the threat to
representative democracy that it is understood to pose. For example,
Gordon Brown’s government in the UK has set in train a process of
exploring new democratic institutions, outside parties, with some
potential to re-engage voters.15 In the Netherlands, direct democracy in
the form of the national policy referendum has been high on the
political agenda in recent years. In short, there is evidence of
exploration of more decentralised, ﬁne-grained modes of representation
by parties – even where parties may not be beneﬁciaries.
2. There is a great deal of recognition, across the countries of Europe and
elsewhere, of a growing interdependence between nations on a regional
and global level. As part of that, there is recognition by parties and their
leaders that the function of ‘political representation’ cannot always be
conﬁned realistically to processes and institutions located clearly within
nation-states. The European Union itself, of course, is one highly
signiﬁcant and complex manifestation of such recognition. Acceptance
of representative roles (among other roles) played by UN institutions
and international courts, on the part of national parties, is increasingly
common. One aspect of the reﬂexive mode is party recognition of the
issue of the porousness of national boundaries, and the interdependence
of different territorial and functional bodies, all of which can make
certain claims to be representative.
3. In recent years, a number of political scientists and others have been
charting a series of trends in contemporary states, all of which suggest
that state functions and styles are shifting in fundamental ways. Some
write of the ‘hollowing out of the state’, suggesting that state functions
are going up (to regional bodies), down (to devolved and local bodies)
and out (to the private and voluntary sectors, for example through
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privatisation and competitive tendering).16 Others have focused on the
rise of functional policy networks, and the signiﬁcance of variegated
processes of ‘governance’ within and beyond the more formal conﬁnes
of government.17 Among other things, such developments offer
challenges to parties as the necessarily central actors in political
change, and as purveyors of singular and enduring ideologies offering
overarching visions of state-led change.
In general terms, the reﬂexive mode of party representation may be less familiar
as a pointer to historical or contemporary practice than popular and statal modes.
Arguably, however, some key elements associated with it are becoming more
evident in a number of countries and contexts. There are factors that encourage
parties to adopt reﬂexive modes: their desire for success, and therefore their need
to adapt to new circumstances, and therefore in turn their need for ﬂexible
responses to trends towards individualisation, globalisation, increased social and
territorial mobility, ‘identity’ rather than class politics, technological advances,
the decline of traditional ideologies, and so on.
These brief comments suggest that we may be living through a moment of
transition from one party mode (the statal) to another (the reﬂexive). I do not
want to overstate this point; at some level, modes of representation are always in
transition, and the evidence for particular trends is complex and contested.18
Would parties that claim to be representative in this way still be parties? I
would argue that they will, and would appeal to Sartori’s baseline deﬁnition of a
function that is performed by political parties but not systematically by other
organisations – the offering of candidates in democratic elections.19 The basis on
which those candidates are put up – the nature of the representative claims made
by and for them – can vary enormously from one mode of representation to
another; again, the representative claim framework stresses precisely repre-
sentation as an economy of tenuous claims rather than a set of undisputed facts.
Taking stock
I have offered three outline ideal-types of representative claims made by political
parties. The ideal-types are recognisable as generalisations of certain ways parties
operated – and the contexts in which they operated – in different historical eras in
Europe, North America and Australasia in particular. They are not primarily
periodisations; rather, they are modes of representative claim-making, with
attendant assumptions about the place, roles and potential of parties. Parties, for
example, may claim to be representative in implicit or explicit ways; in staged
or taken-for-granted ways; in top-down or bottom-up ways; in electoral contexts
or extra-electoral contexts; in ways pertaining to the nation-state only, or to
cross-national interests as well.
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Clearly, the environment in which parties claim to be representative inﬂuences
the types of claims that are made, and that are likely to be successful (which is
not to say that parties themselves cannot sometimes manipulate the environment
to suit them). A key feature of that environment is just how many serious
competitors parties have when it comes to claiming to represent varied con-
stituencies and audiences. Many observers have rightly noted that the environ-
ment today – and, projecting forward, in the likely medium-term future – is more
competitive than ever before in the historical life of parties. There are competitors
with respect to who makes representative claims – NGOs, and citizens them-
selves, for example, make more effective, prominent and constant representative
claims than previously. The character of the claims varies too. For example,
cultural identity claims can be troubling for parties who (unless they are expli-
citly regional or ethnicity-based parties) seek to encompass and ‘bundle’ a wide
set of citizen interests.
Strongly moral or religious claims can likewise be troubling given the need for
parties to be prepared to compromise, internally and with other parties, in the
pragmatic name of the consistent maintenance of government.20
What I have sought to do is to stress that democratic representation is not
something that parties used to (be able to) do, and that they no longer do. To
argue that is to over-generalise on the basis of one mode of representative claim-
making – broadly speaking the one I have called the popular mode. It is also to
take representation as exhausted in electoral results, which it clearly is not – no
group or person can ever fully represent, and many different groups and people
(elected and otherwise) are capable of mounting convincing representative
claims, not least in largely free and democratic systems. And further, it is to
assume that ‘representative democracy’ takes a much more ﬁxed, non-negotiable
form than in fact it can.
By the same token, the circumstances that encourage statal or reﬂexive rather
than popular representative claim-making by parties do not necessarily add up to a
picture that is less democratic. It can, rather, be differently democratic: a style
of democratic practice which, for example, does not afford a strong privilege to
electoral modes of participation over a variety of others, and which does not
privilege or require a particular party form. It is understandable that the statal mode
of party representation may be seen as less democratic, certainly in comparison to
the popular mode. Party scholars tend to see it that way, amid concern that the
statal mode coincides with what they see as a sharp decline in ‘representational’
functions of parties, since parties have fewer grassroots members, are more reliant
on the state for funding, are detached from class and other societal interests, and so
on. Representative democracy, in its classical deﬁnitions, is supposed to be about
representing the people to the state, and not the other way around. However,
nationalism and the consolidation of linguistically and otherwise culturally
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homogeneous nation-states also went hand-in-glove with the development of
modern representative democracy, providing one of its core conditions of possibility.
Hence, the phenomenon of statal parties (claiming to be) speaking for the nation has
democratic resonances too. Likewise, centralisation of power within the state and
state initiative-taking has also, historically, been associated with democracy. The
development of the welfare state in post-Second World War western Europe, and the
New Deal in the United States, are examples of the expansion and deploy-
ment of state power, driven by party ideology, and defended through theories of
fairness, equality and opportunity which resonate deeply with democratic principles.
Resonances of one or other mode with democracy are, in sum, historically
contingent; this is the primary reason for my argument that there is no intrinsic
democratic ranking we can apply to the three different modes of representation.
Is democracy unthinkable save for political parties, today? Maybe it was, in the
era when democracy was characterised by the dominance of popular representative
claims by parties. But in the democracy-to-come21 – which by deﬁnition will grow
from seeds already germinated – it may not be. As democracy is rethought and
remade, perhaps party forms and the necessity of parties deserve rethinking (and a
number of parties are facing up to some of the key challenges of responsiveness
and decentralisation, for example).22 Parties may become ‘mutants’ or ‘hybrids’23
to the point where they are no longer recognised as parties as such. Parties which
edge towards claiming to be representative primarily in reﬂexive mode have
already gone some way down that road. In the end, whether democracy is
unthinkable save for political parties is no longer the question we need to ask.
Rather, we need to ask: what kinds of representative democracy are thinkable? And
what forms of party claims, if any, are appropriate to them?
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